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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization has changed the way global society addresses common
and global problems. While there is much talk about aiming at sustainable
development, there are no real clear definitions of sustainable development
and the term remains susceptible to much misuse. Globalization is defined
in the literature in many different ways. It refers to the economic, social,
financial, legal, communication and technological revolutions taking place
and "rather than mere random encounters, globalization refers to these
entrenched and enduring patterns of world-wide connectedness."' Held and
* Joyeeta Gupta is a professor on climate change policy and laws at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam and is Professor on Policy and Law on Water Resources and the Environment at the
UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, Delft. This paper has been written in the context of two
projects - the project on Inter-governmental and private environmental regimes and compatibility with
good governance, rule of law and sustainable development - financed by the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research (contract 452-02-031) and the EU financed project on Sustainability Labeling
and Certification (Contract No. EVGI-CT-2000-0003 1).
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McGrew argue that it encapsulates the notion that action taken in one place
can have impacts elsewhere, that time and space are compressed through
instant communication, that there is increasing interdependence as societies
are dependent on each other because of the systems that link them, that we
live in a shrinking world as countries appear to be much closer to each
other, and that there is global integration.2
The rapid process of globalization is leading explicitly and implicitly
to major changes in the way we manage our problems. These changes are
leading academics and politicians to talk more in terms of governance, than
in the limited terms of international law. Governance refers to the
purposeful process of managing societal resources through institutions,
from the family to international institutions.
Governance takes place in the context of global society. However,
there is considerable controversy about whether we have a global
community and society in the sense that the same legal values at national
level are also operational at the international level. For those inspired by
Hobbes, there is no global society, only global anarchy and the most
powerful prevail.3 For others, we are inching gradually forward towards a
rule based international society that shares some basic common norms and
values and that is held together by solidarity.
4
Whether we live in global anarchy or in a global society, we are
dealing with global problems. While to the uninitiated it might seem fairly
innocuous to talk about global problems, this term too is politically charged.
The theoretical battle in the context of international law has been staged
with respect to the concept of the common heritage of humankind. A
parallel battle has been played out in the economics field in relation to the
issue of what public goods are.5  Within the political sciences, the
discussion has taken a different approach and scientists argue that problems
are socially constructed and hence there is no objective definition of a
problem. 6 In the North-South context, there is considerable controversy
about what global problems are, with many arguing that only when
2. See David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction,
in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
3. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER 3 (2003).
4. See id. at 3-5.
5. See generally PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION (Inge
Kaul et al. eds., 2003).
6. See, e.g., David Held, What Hope for the Future?: Learning the Lessons of the Past, 9
IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 381 (2002); see also Detlev Vagts & Martti Koskenniemi, Book
Review, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 160 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP ALLOTIr, EUNOMIA. NEW ORDER FOR A NEW
WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press, 1990)).
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problems may have negative impacts on the North are they labeled as global
problems.7
In order to deal with this complex of global problems, ranging from
social through economic to environmental, the concept of sustainable
development has been adopted by scientists and politicians alike.
Sustainable development is defined as progress "that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs."8  It is a process of change "in which the exploitation of
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological
development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both
current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations." 9 The
Brundtland Commission further states that sustainable development calls
for citizen participation in decision making, a self-reliant and sustained
economic system that generates surpluses, a social context in which social
problems can be dealt with, a system in which production processes are
compatible with the existing resource base and its conservation, a
sustainable international trade and finance system and an administrative
system that learns from past mistakes. ° The Rio Declaration defines
sustainable development as "[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and
future generations."'1 Courts are reluctant to see more in this idea than a
concept, 12 even though some judges see the concept as being an
"inescapable logical necessity."' 3 The concept has become very respectable
since the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 2002 focused
all its energies on it.14  Environmental and trade organizations and
7. See, e.g., ANIL AGARWAL, ET AL., THE COMM'N ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
GLOBAL CHANGE, FOR EARTH'S SAKE: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND GLOBAL CHANGE 25-26 (1992). See also THE SOUTH COMM'N, THE CHALLENGE TO THE SOUTH:
THE REPORT OF THE SOUTH COMMISSION (1990).
8. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE: WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 43 (1988).
9. See id. at 46.
10. See id. at 65.
It. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, principle 3, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, 31 1.L.M. 874, 877. See also Report on the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 2002, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. I51/26/REV.l.
12. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
13. See id. at 95 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
14. See Hans Christian Bugge & Lawrence Watters, Interview, A Perspective on Sustainable
Development after Johannesburg on the Fifteenth Anniversary of our Common Future: An Interview
with Gro Harlem Brundtland, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (2003).
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agreements deal with it. 15  The European Union has also adopted
sustainable development as an operative goal in many of its legal and policy
documents. 16 While for some the concept of sustainable development is a
single goal, 17 for others it contains a body of principles.18 The International
Law Association foresees the emergence of an international law of
sustainable development, which includes seven critical principles.'
9
Against this background, this article highlights the key elements of
new forms of governance, by referring to the new actors in governance, the
shifts in the locus of governance, and the changing rules in traditional forms
of governance. In doing so, it highlights the changing influence of non-
state actors in policymaking (see Part II). It then argues that there are five
types of governance relationships. It briefly examines the situation with
respect to the issues of governance on climate change, water and sustainable
development. These examples illustrate the different ways in which non-
state actors are participating and changing governance dynamics in specific
fields (see Part III). It then goes on to examine the special challenges
emerging in the area of sustainability labeling and certification where non-
state actors have in effect carved out an area of governance all for
themselves and this has led to a series of legal questions in a number of
areas of law (see Part IV). The paper concludes by drawing some
15. See Melinda L. Kimble, Public-Private Partnerships: A Tool for Sustainable
Development?, 2003 A.L.I. - A.B.A. C.L.E. 121, 125-29.
16. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/8/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 50; Decision No. 1230/2003/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 29; Council Decision No.
1999/170/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 64) 58; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Communication on
Towards a thematic strategy on the sustainable use of natural resources, 2004 O.J. (C 121) 47;
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - The World Summit
on Sustainable Development one year on: implementing our commitments SEC(2003) 14710E,
COM(2003) 829 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament - 2003 Environment Policy Review - Consolidating the environmental pillar of sustainable
development, COM(2003) 745 final; Resolution on a new strategy for agriculture in arctic regions, 1999
O.J. (C 175) 27; Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Decision on the review of the European Community Programme of policy and
action in relation to the environment and sustainable development 'Towards sustainability," 1996 O.J.
(C 212) 1.
17. See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Sustainable Development, Myth or Reality?: A Survey of
Sustainable Development Under International Law and Sri Lankan Law, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
265,280-81 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Dr. Ranee Khooshie Lal Panjabi, From Stockholm to Rio: A Comparison of the
Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law, 21 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 215, (1993).
19. INT'L LAW ASS'N., NEW DELHI DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
RELATING TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2002) [hereinafter NEW DELHI DECLARATION]. The New
Delhi Declaration was later brought to the attention of the United Nations at the World Summit on
Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa from August 26, 2002 to September 4,
2002. World Summit on Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/CONF 199/8 (2002). A more detailed
exploration of the concept was undertaken in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (Nico Schrijver & Friedl Weiss eds., 2004).
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conclusions about how non-state actors are shaping the new developments
in international law.
II. NEW FORMS OF GOVERNANCE
A. Introduction
At the international level, we are now witnessing new forms of
governance. There is a rise of new actors in the process of governance (see
II.B), there is a shift in the locus of governance to new arenas (see section
II.C), and existing rules in traditional governance arenas are changing (see
IID).
B. New Actors in Governance
Although realists tend to argue that only states are critical in
determining policies at international level, liberal institutionalists argue that
non-state actors have a decided influence in the international arena.20 The
participation of non-state actors in international governance is not new. The
history can be traced back to about 200 years.21 What is new is the fast
evolving way in which these actors are influencing the governance
processes.
Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and social
movements have progressed from small-scale bodies to either grass-roots
movements or global organizations focusing on protecting a specific en-
vironmental resource and representing the interests of their constituency.
ENGOs can be federations of international and national organizations, 22 or
have universal/hybrid membership, 23 have intercontinental memberships,
24
have regional membership,25  or be internationally-oriented national
20. See generally Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 147 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996).
21. See Steve Chanovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 190-91 (1997).
22. For example, this would include groups like Greenpeace (http://www.greenpeace.org),
Friends of the Earth (http://www.foei.org), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
(http://www.panda.org), and the Environment Liaison Centre International (http://www.elci.org).
23. See, e.g., International Union for the Conservation of Nature, a/k/a The World
Conservation Union, at http://www.iuncn.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
24. See, e.g., Birdlife International, at http://www.birdlife.net (last visited Mar. 14, 2005);
Wetlands International, at http://www.wetlands.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
25. See, e.g., African Wildlife Foundation, at http://www.awf.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2005);
European Environmental Bureau, at http://www.eeb.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
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groups26.27 They have often worked in international networks such as the
Pesticide Action Network (PAN), Basel Action Network (BAN), and the
Climate Action Network (CAN). Ideologically, they may be conservative
such as The World Conservation Union (IUCN) to extreme left wing groups
28
such as Earth First. Their tools include neutral news bulletins, position
papers, regional assessments, support to national delegations by partici-
pating in them, or advising them, or by monitoring the implementation,29
and by organizing demonstrations. Indirectly they influence global gover-
nance through writing books, publishing journals, participating in confer-
ences, advertisements, and media coverage. 30  These bodies assess,
assimilate, and synthesize the information generated and try to ensure trans-
parency in the governance process. Some conventions even result from the
pressure used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 3' The literature
reveals a difference between Northern and Southern NGOs in terms of
issues (environment and development issues respectively), funding and
techniques.32
Another very influential actor in international governance is industry.
The chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) producers prominently participated in the
negotiations on the depletion of the ozone layer. The energy companies are
major actors in the negotiations on climate change. In general, it is large
industry or confederations of large industries that are present at negotia-
tions. The electricity and pesticide industries were present at the negotia-
tions on the long-range transboundary movement of atmospheric pollutants.
Industry participates as observers in negotiations, but their primary route of
influence is via lobbying and advocacy at the national level. They also
publish advertisements and research. They mostly represent the interests of
industry in the very rich countries.
26. See, e.g., Centre for Science and Environment, at http://www.cseindia.org (last visited
Mar. 14, 2005); Sierra Club, at http://www.sierraclub.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
27. See generally John McCormick, The Role of Environmental NGOs in International
Regimes, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND POLICY 52 (Norman J. Vig &
Regina S. Axelrod eds., 1999).
28. This includes the EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN, http://www.iisd.ca/enbvollenb-
background.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005), published by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development.
29. One such body is the wildlife trade monitoring network, Trade Records Analysis of Flora
and Fauna in Commerce (TRAFFIC), http://www.traffic.org, which monitors the implementation of
laws at the international level.
30. McCormick, supra note 27 at 65-68.
31. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125 (entered into force May 5, 1992).
32. McCormick, supra note 27, at 58-61. See generally PRATAP CHATTERJEE & MATTHIAS
FINGER, THE EARTH BROKERS: POWER, POLITICs AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1994).
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A third influential actor is the scientific community. These communi-
ties are defined as professional networks that are organized around specific
issues and are seen as authoritative sources of information. In the discus-
sions on the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) regime,
the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-
range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) played a key role
in monitoring the pollutants and in providing the evidence needed to deal
with the issue, which led to the adoption of the first Sulfur Protocol.33 In
the climate negotiations, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
plays a very important part in the negotiations. 34 In the ozone depletion
regime, reports from the Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project
and from the Coordinating Committee of the Ozone Layer (CCOL), which
was established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in
cooperation with The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the
late 1970s played an important role.35 The scientific communities influence
the negotiations through their publications, the assessment reports and often
have a direct line of communication to the negotiations as they are allowed
36to report on their findings.
I see five stages in the development of NGO influence in environ-
mental treaty negotiations. 37 In the first stage, non-state actors were mostly
consulted during the negotiation process, as was allowed by the United
Nations Charter of 1945 and the Economic and Social Council's Resolution
of 1968.38 In the second stage beginning in the 1970s, non-state actors were
mostly elite observers and behind the stage managers of international
negotiations. 39 There were few prestigious organizations such as the IUCN
and these bodies were influential in actually drafting text for the Conven-
tion on the International Trade in Endangered Species, 40 and the Convention
33. See generally Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent,
July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215.
34. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, available at
http://www.ipcc.chl (last visited July 19, 2005).
35. Id.
36. See generally Joyeeta Gupta, Effectiveness of Air Pollution Treaties: The Role of
Knowledge, Power and Participation, 12 POL'Y STUD. REv. ANN. 145 (Matthijs Hisschembller et al.,
eds 2001).
37. Joyeeta Gupta, The Role of Non-State Actors in International Environmental Affairs, 63
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [HEIDELBERG J. INT'L
L.] 459, 462 (2003).
38. Id. at 462-63.
39. Id. at 463-64.
40. Id. at 463 (citing Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora
and Fauna (CITES), Apr. 13, 1987, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243).
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on Biological Diversity.4' In the third stage, the role of non-state actors
increased considerably.42 They became protected by international agree-
ments, empowered by them and also engaged by them to undertake
activities. In the fourth stage, non-state actors were so active that they were
possibly taking the law into their own hands and developing their own rules
on managing environmental resources.43 While a classical example of the
latter is the International Standards Organization, in recent years, this has
taken the form of sustainability labeling and certification schemes, among
others. This is discussed further in Part IV. There is an explosion in the
number of participants at international negotiations. This inevitably leads
to competition between the various groups. This competition has led in
some cases to the development of rules to identify who is eligible for
participation and hence also leads to exclusion particularly of late comers to
the field.44 In the fifth stage, there is an effort to bypass the competition
between non-state actors and state actors in the area of governance by
making non-state actors partners in governance, especially through the
opportunity of negotiating Type 2 Agreements under the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (see Part III). 45
C. Shifts in the Locus of Governance
A second major feature of the new forms of governance is the shift in
the locus of governance to other forums. These include the shift to national
and international courts, to supranational levels, to the private sector and
co-regulation, to other countries, to the river-basin level in the case of
water, and to the local level through the principle of subsidiarity. These are
briefly discussed below.
Governance is shifting from traditional arenas to the courts. This is
especially the case in the European Union, where court based governance
was not very common in the civil law countries. In the climate change
issue, United States NGOs are also litigating against the United States
46 rltvlgovernment. A relatively new and novel approach is the way the
41. Id. (citing Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 143
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993)).
42. Gupta, supra note 37, at 464-69.
43. Id. at 469-71.
44. See Joyeeta Gupta, Non-State Actors: Undermining or Increasing the Legitimacy and
Transparency of International Environmental Law, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
THEORY 297 (Ige F. Dekker & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004) (detailing the role of non-state actors in
the climate change field and the competition among these actors).
45. Gupta, supra note 37, at 472-77.
46. There are lawsuits being initiated by non-state actors and municipalities versus Banks and
International investment corporations on behalf of members and citizens who may be victims of global
[Vol. 11:497
Palestinian government approached the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
to discuss the legality of the wall being built by Israel. Not being an
independent country, Palestine could not approach the court directly, and
even if it could, it is unlikely that Israel would have agreed to the jurisdic-
tion of the court. Instead, Palestine lobbied with the General Assembly and
the General Assembly requested the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on the
issue. The ICJ brought out its advisory opinion on the wall recently.47
There is also a shift to the supranational level. This is certainly the
case for the European Union, where policymaking in a number of issue
areas is moving to supranational level. Via the process of privatization of
natural resources and basic services, governance is also shifting to the
private sector.. In the area of transport, energy and water management, key
decision making processes are moving to the private sector. One can even
argue that where implementation of international law is weak, some
countries are seeking to ensure compliance in other countries through
national regulations. An example is the Pelly Amendment in the United
States and its impact on countries in Asia. In a slightly reverse situation,
we see treaties that call on parties to allow foreign nationals the use of their
domestic courts to seek redress.48
In the area of water, we see a shift in the governance processes to the
basin level. This is because of the scientific need for fresh water in inter-
national river basins to be managed as a whole. As a result, policy-making
processes are shifting from national and international to the river basin level
(fluvial level). At the same time, in order to guarantee the implementation
of policies, we see a shift to the local level, via the principle of subsidiarity
and empowerment of non-state actors through increased opportunities for
participation in decision-making processes and through providing them
opportunities for legal redress in domestic courts of other countries.
There are three key implications emerging from the discussion above.
The first is that there are multiple forums developing simultaneously for
problem solving. The second is that the multiple shifts work to empower
the weak (as in the case of using the ICJ or foreign courts to seek redress)
but they may also dis-empower the weak (if the other party indulges in
forum shopping). The third is that some of these shifts may be mutually
warming. There is a lawsuit that has been initiated by the non-state actors against the United States
Environment Protection Agency (EPA), including another case initiated by 11 states, territories, and
NGOs versus the EPA.
47. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004, I.C.J., 43 l.L.M. 1009 (July 9).
48. See, e.g., Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making,
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force
Oct. 30, 2001); Southern African Development Community Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in
the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 7, 2000,40 I.L.M. 321.
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incompatible. For example, a shift to local people via participation may not
be compatible with a shift to privatization where power is transferred to the
private sector. Similarly, a shift to policy making at the fluvial level may
not be entirely compatible with empowering the local people to make
decisions.
D. Changing Rules in Existing Governance
At the same time, the exogenous changes are also influencing the
changes within the traditional rule making process at the international level.
I would like to discuss four points here: the concept of interactional law
making, the implicit suspension of rules of procedure to meet substantive
deadlines, the challenges posed by new problems to the implicit and explicit
assumptions of international law, and the rise of new economic oriented
principles at the cost of more legal oriented principles.
Observing the way international laws are being developed, it is becom-
ing increasingly clear that in complex environmental negotiations, decisions
are being taken continuously. Or at least the process of developing the
decision is a continuous one. In such a situation, it is no longer relevant for
countries to think they are not bound by decisions of the Conference of the
Parties, but only by those formal legal agreements that their countries have
ratified, adhered to or accepted. Brunnre and Toop6 refer to this as the
notion of interactional law making.49
Again, on the basis of observation of various negotiation processes,
what becomes immediately obvious is that the formal rules of procedure are
often suspended in order to be practical. This has led on numerous
occasions to the organization of small working groups to discuss complex
issues. Sometimes the number of working groups greatly exceeds the
number of country representatives and most often, the language is English.
Furthermore, meetings on occasion go far beyond normal working hours
and often even beyond the formal ending time of the conference. All these
imply in fact an implicit if not explicit suspension of the rules of procedure,
which can have negative impacts on delegations with limited resources both
financial and human. °
Interviews with developing country negotiators have also led me to
conclude that the developments, particularly in science and information
generation, have been so rapid that these have implied that frequently those
negotiating on behalf of the less wealthy countries often have not had the
49. See generally Jutta Brunie & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism:
Elements of an Interactional Theory ofInternational Law, 39 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (2000).
50. See Joyeeta Gupta, North-South Aspects of the Climate Change Issue: Towards a
Negotiating Theory and Strategyfor Developing Countries, 3 INT'L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 115 (2000).
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preparations necessary to negotiate the issue in substantive terms. 5 The
implicit assumption of treaty law that countries will send prepared negotia-
tors and that the negotiating process will be a balanced process is
challenged by these findings.52  The participation of non-state actors as
observers in these negotiations does not always serve to balance the North-
South imbalance that emerges in such situations.53 This is because the bulk
of the scientists, industrialists and NGOs present at such negotiations pri-
marily from Anglo-Saxon countries, are implicitly or explicitly influenced
by such interests. At the same time, in designing solutions for the
international negotiations, there are clear examples of countries competing
with each other to ensure that their solutions become the chosen solutions.
This ensures less regulatory change for them and hence lower implemen-
tation costs. While this is a subtle process, a more explicit process is that of
using the best practices. This in fact encourages competition. While com-
petition in theory leads to the best solutions, whether in fact these solutions
are implementable in a vast variety of local and national contexts is
disputable.54
Finally, traditional law principles such as equity are giving way to the
principle of cost-effectiveness. How can policies be addressed at lowest
economic costs, rather than at lowest socio-political cost? This has led to
the development of a number of market mechanisms to address global
environmental problems. While many of these market mechanisms are self-
enforcing in the sense that once the regulatory conditions are created, social
actors will wish to participate in them, this often comes at the cost of
traditional legal principles of human rights and justice. The use of market
mechanisms within public international law agreements inevitably leads to
contracts, which are governed by the private law of contracts and possibly
bilateral investment treaties. The impact of the interface between public
international law and commercial law is as yet unclear, but could lead to
commercial norms being upheld at the cost of other legal norms.
51. See Joyeeta Gupta, Legitimacy in the Real World: A Case Study of the Developing
Countries, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Climate Change, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 482, 496-500 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001)
(providing detailed exploration of the implicit and explicit assumptions of treaty law that are not always
observed in fact).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 500.
54. See Joyeeta Gupta, Regulatory Competition and Developing Countries and the Challenge
for Compliance-Push and Pull Measures, in MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (Gerd Winter ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2005) (on file with
the author) (elaborating this argument).
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III. COMBINATIONS OF GOVERNANCE PATrERNS
A. Introduction
We are not only witnessing the rise of non-state actors, shift in
decision making forums and changes in traditional decision making struc-
tures, but we are also seeing new hybrid governance patterns. Although the
literature tends to differentiate only between horizontal and vertical gover-
nance, I tend to differentiate five types of governance patterns. I have used
terms that can be portrayed graphically in order to be able to present the
information in an easily communicable manner to both scientists and
policymakers.
B. Types of Governance
There are five types of governance patterns. First, horizontal gover-
nance patterns which refer to relations between countries at the same level
of hierarchy. In other words, it refers to how municipalities relate to each
other, provinces to each other, and states to each other.
Second, vertical governance refers to the relationships between
countries across different levels of hierarchy. This looks at relationships
between municipalities, through provinces, states, supranational entities to
the global governance level. The predominant focus on horizontal and
vertical governance has been the subject of public international law.
Third, diagonal relationships examine the way in which state actors
deal with non-state actors. I refer to this as diagonal because non-state
actors are not organized in a comparable system of hierarchy. These
relationships are increasingly becoming more and more important because
with the shrinking state, responsibility for taking measures is increasingly
shifting to these non-state actors. The literature refers to this type of gover-
nance as co-regulation.
Fourth, parallel relationships refer to the initiatives taken by the non-
state actors themselves in the process of governance. This is undertaken
sometimes as a public relations measure and sometimes to pre-empt
government action. The literature refers to this as self-regulation.
Fifth, point governance refers to the increasing role of courts in
influencing policies in countries. Within the European Union, the European
Court has significant powers. But with the International Court of Justice's
advisory opinion of 9 July 2004 on the Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, we are witnessing
creative ways to access the Court, and the fact that the Court is willing to
deal with highly charged political issues." Similarly, in the area of
investment law, there have been more than 100 arbitral proceedings in the
55. Advisory Opinion No. 131, supra note 47.
[Vol. 11:497
last decade and a new body of highly intrusive and often inconsistent law is
being created.56 Within a specific regime, hybrid systems of governance are
emerging. This section briefly shows how different environmental regimes
have adopted hybrid forms of governance.
C. Case Study of Climate Change
The climate change regime refers to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997s.57 It
also includes decisions of the ten Conferences of the Parties that have been
held thus far. This regime has very strong horizontal relationships between
countries by virtue of the treaties. These treaties elaborate on the quantita-
tive and qualitative obligations of countries and the regularity with which
the Conference of the Parties have to meet. This keeps the pressure on the
system to incrementally develop the regime further. It has very strong
vertical relationships with the national authorities by virtue of the commit-
ments that have to be implemented at national and local level, the reporting
requirements and the strong non-compliance mechanisms being developed.
There are also multiple diagonal relationships with non-state actors. There
are formal channels of communication to the epistemic communities to
ensure that the process is informed by the best available science. Other
non-state actors are also permitted to participate in the process of negotia-
tion. Finally, non-state actors may participate in the market mechanisms
being developed by the regime. Although non-state actors may contribute
to the implementation, the non-compliance mechanism holds states
accountable if goals are not met. And since that is the case, states are
developing stringent mechanisms to control and monitor the participation of
these actors in these schemes. However, clearly once contracts are drawn
up between non-state actors and/or non-state actors and state actors, these
will be governed by the principles of private international law and possibly
by the bilateral investment treaties. One can conclude that from a design
perspective the climate change regime has a strong hybrid system of
horizontal, vertical and diagonal governance. This is not to deny that there
are leaks in the system because of the low level of commitments and the
scientific and reporting weaknesses in the regime. In addition, as men-
56. A look at the World Bank website shows that there are more than 150 arbitration
proceedings that have taken place in the last few years. World Bank Group, at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/main.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2005).
57. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, 165; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/1997/L.7/add.l. (1997). For more details on the bilateral
agreements that the United States is entering into, see Francesco Sindico & Joyeeta Gupta, Moving the
Climate Change Regime Further Through a Hydrogen Protocol, 13 REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 175 (2004).
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tioned earlier, there is some ongoing climate change related litigation in the
United States and some new court cases are expected in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights.58 These may set judicial precedents that may
potentially influence processes in other countries and at the multilateral
level. However, apart from noting that this is happening, it is too early to
conclude what may happen with these. In addition, the climate change
regime also has a large number of unrelated initiatives; including those of
the local authorities who wish to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and
the bilateral agreements that the United States has been entering into with
other countries on climate change and hydrogen.59
D. Case Study of Water
In the case of water, it is difficult to speak of a water regime. There is
one global treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigable Uses of International Watercourses, 60 which is yet to enter into
force. Thus, the global horizontal agreement is not in force. There are
some 400 water treaties between large numbers of riparians that have been
negotiated over the last two hundred years.61 Individually, each treaty is
being implemented primarily by the riparian states parties to those
agreements and the driving factor behind the effective implementation is the
reciprocity embodied in these agreements and the international river basin
commissions and organizations established by these agreements. This does
not, however, mean that there are no legal and political conflicts in these
regimes. There is thus strong horizontal and vertical governance in this
field at the river basin level. Over the years, there have been a number of
judicial decisions that have promoted various principles of law. There has
been some court jurisprudence in the field, and this jurisprudence and state
practice has provided the basis of the current law on water.
Most of the public international law agreements have not promoted the
private sector's participation in decision-making. However, through the
liberalization of markets, the private sector has increasingly become
engaged in the water sector through public private partnerships. This has to
some extent been promoted by international organizations and by inter-
national conferences on water, many of which have not been held under UN
58. See generally Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/DefaultE.htm (last visited July 19, 2005).
59. Sindico & Gupta, supra note 57.
60. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 17
Dec. 1996, 36 I.L.M. 700, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/869 (1997).
61. UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME, ATLAS OF INTERNATIONAL FRESHWATER
AGREEMENTS 2 (2002), available at
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/#acrobat.
[Vol. 11:497
auspices. This process of decision-making has actually followed a parallel
track to the pure legal developments, and has been driven by a top down
process of policy making on water.
With globalization, we are now witnessing a process by which many
other legal systems may also influence water governance. The develop-
ments in trade and investment law will also influence the rights of govern-
ments to govern on water issues and will determine how disputes are to be
addressed. Thus in the area of water law, we have many competing
policy/legal processes that operate horizontally, vertically, diagonally as
well as through adjudication.
E. Case Study of World Summit on Sustainable Development
In the area of sustainable development, the key global conference was
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) which concluded
in 2002 with a policy document adopted by the participating countries
(Type 1 agreement), and with a large number of Type 2 agreements
between state and non-state actors.62 The policy agreement between
countries is not a legally binding document. Although it runs into a large
number of pages, the document does not specify who must do what and
where. It is a very weak policy document, not reflecting the systematic
nature of Agenda 21 adopted ten years previously.63 The horizontal agree-
ment is thus weak. This anticipated weakness led the organizers of the
WSSD to seek new partnerships with non-state actors. This led to the
adoption of Type 2 agreements, which allow social actors to make partner-
ships with each other to achieve the specific goals that they themselves
wish to commit to. There are many of these diagonal agreements. How-
ever, there are no vertical agreements to verify compliance. Nor is there a
clear relationship between the weak horizontal agreement and the
enormously varying diagonal agreements except to the extent that in general
the Type.2 initiatives are expected to contribute to the Type 1 goals.
The above case studies have shown three different roles for non-state
actors in specific regimes. In the climate change regime, there is a clear
central treaty and non-state actors are encouraged within the regime to
undertake measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. There are specific
links to the science produced by non-state actors and such actors are
allowed to participate as observers in the regime. In water, the public
international water law agreements essentially specified the role of state
62. See Ulrich Beyerlin & Martin Reichard, The Johannesburg Summit: Outcome and Overall
Assessment, 63 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 213 (2003) (providing for an assessment of the World Summit
on Sustainable Development).
63. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/PC/100/Add. 1(1992).
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actors. However, the international policy processes have promoted the role
of private actors in the liberalization of water; this is being further
elaborated upon within public international law developments within the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services." In the WSSD regime, two types of agreements were
encouraged one between states and one between state and non-state actors.
While the latter ostensibly empowers non-state actors by allowing them to
enter into agreements, the very voluntary nature of these agreements show
that it is not a well designed system and that the increasing importance of
non-state actors has come hand in hand with the decreasing political will of
state actors to actually take serious policy measures to deal with global
problems.
IV. EXAMINING SUSTAINABILITY LABELING
A. Introduction
Let us now turn to the issue of sustainability labeling and certification.
Despite the huge and growing legislation on environmental, economic,
social and human rights issues at the supranational, regional and inter-
national level, many social actors feel that this is not enough to achieve the
goal of sustainable development. ENGOs are very actively engaged in
demanding that industry "clean up its act" while, on the other hand, con-
sumers too wish increasingly to access sustainable products. All this
implies that there is a strong pull and push effect on industry and the latter
is now developing internal or sectoral strategies to cope with the pressure.
They are thus developing parallel initiatives focusing on "business
strategies and activities that meet the needs of the enterprise and its stake-
holders today while protecting, sustaining, and enhancing the human and
natural resources that will be needed in the future."6 5 Over the years, these
initiatives have evolved from schemes that dealt with labor conditions and
trade relations, through environmental schemes to 'sustainability' schemes
and today there are multiple initiatives of various sorts. The purpose of
such schemes is to influence the production process to such an extent that it
becomes sustainable or at least is perceived as sustainable.
These questions remain: How sustainable are these schemes in
meet-ing their goals? Are these schemes developed using the principles of
good governance? To what extent do these schemes give rise to conflict
64. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6), 55 U.N.T.S. 194;
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IB, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994). Texts of all WTO agreements are available from
the World Trade Organization's website at http://www.wto.org.
65. See generally INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEADERSHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE '90S, at 11 (1992).
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with trade rules and/or are compatible with international environmental and
social law? A project undertaken by the University of Barcelona in Spain,
the University of Bologna in Italy and the VrYe Universiteit in Amsterdam
focused on understanding the new developments in the field of sustain-
ability labeling and certification schemes in the context of sustainable
development. It aimed at providing a conceptual and theoretical elaboration
of the key issues involved, including the challenges to international law and
to facilitate the design of successful strategies to increase the positive
impacts of these schemes.66 The research focused on voluntary, not manda-
tory67 labeling schemes, based on second and third party verified claims.
68
Following an elaboration of the concept of sustainable development, the
research analyzed the legal, institutional and organizational framework
within which such schemes operate. It then undertook an inventory of the
different schemes and further elaborated on five case studies: jeans, capture
fisheries, fruit and vegetables, forestry products, and eco-tourism. The case
studies analyzed the sustainability labeling and certification schemes in
terms of their sustainability content, compatibility with international law,
market impacts, trade aspects, and good governance. The research con-
cluded by analyzing and synthesizing the results. The rest of this section
highlights some of the key results of the research and some of the case
studies undertaken are further elaborated on in this volume.
Before going further, it might be useful to understand the key steps and
terms in sustainability labeling and certification schemes. In these schemes,
the first step is the setting of standards, which includes identification of
principles underlying the scheme, and quantitative and/or qualitative stand-
ard setting. The process of setting standards includes the articulation of the
definitions of the principles embedded in the scheme and the standards and
criteria that the applicants69 and licensees ° need to comply with. Following
this, the products, services and production processes are certified. Finally,
the bodies that certify need to be accredited.
66. See SUSTAINABILITY LABELING AND CERTIFICATION (Mar Eritja Campins & Marcial
Pons, eds., 2004) (publishing the research).
67. This includes for example, energy labeling schemes for electrical appliances of the
European Union.
68. In contrast, first party claims are those made by the producer himself without independent
verification.
69. An applicant is a legal entity applying for a label or certificate for a product or range of
products.
70. A licensee is an applicant to which a label or certificate has been awarded.
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B. Key Issues in Sustainability Labeling
For the purpose of the project we concluded that sustainability issues
that were potentially relevant to sustainability labeling included ecological
(which includes environmental and biodiversity related aspects), social
(human health, human rights, labor conditions and animal welfare) and
economic aspects (mostly trade related issues). We felt that in adopting
such schemes it was important that parties paid attention to the principles of
good governance, which include legitimacy, transparency, participation,
accountability, effectiveness and coherence. 71 Against these preliminary
definitions, we examined if the emerging labeling and certification schemes
can be seen as sustainable by producers and consumers, or against some
universal standards, whether these schemes are compatible with inter-
national law or not, whether these schemes have a potential distorting
impact on markets and may influence North-South relations, and the extent
to which such schemes are developed on the basis of the principles of good
governance.
In the inventory of such schemes, the research showed that state and
non-state actors are actively engaged in developing multi-sector schemes
(such as environmental schemes, fair trade schemes, organic schemes and
integrated production schemes) as well as a range of sector specific
schemes focusing on clothes, textiles and footwear, marine and fish life,
food and beverages and tourism. The environmental schemes are mostly
public or semi-public schemes and often undertaken within the context of a
private international umbrella organization; the fair trade schemes are
mostly fully private, the organic schemes are mainly private although the
involvement of the public sector is increasing, while the integrated
production schemes are mainly private. The sectoral schemes are mainly
private although often there are relevant public international regulatory
frameworks such as the Food and Agricultural Organization's initiatives on
responsible fisheries and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.72 An
attempt to score the sustainability of these different schemes shows that fair
trade schemes and organic schemes score relatively high.73 On the basis of
the preliminary inventory, five sectors were chosen and within these
sectors, specific schemes were selected (Fair trade schemes: Kuyuchi
jeans; Fisheries-capture fisheries: Marine Stewardship Council; etc.). Of
these schemes, the Kuyuchi jeans scheme scored very high in terms of its
sustainability content, while the International Foundation for Organic
71. Joop De Boer et al., The Conceptual Framework, in SUSTAINABILITY LABELING AND
CERTIFICATION, supra note 66, at 39-48.
72. Nicolien Van Der Grijp & Luke Brander, Multi-Sector and Sector Specific Schemes, in
SUSTAINABILITY LABELING AND CERTIFICATION, supra note 66, at 86-87.
73 Id. at 88.
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Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) scheme on fruits and vegetables and the
Forest Stewardship Council scheme also scored fairly well.74
In examining the international legal context, the project concluded that
there are several international conventions on environmental and biodiver-
sity related issues, on labor and human rights issues and on trade related
issues and these conventions set the boundary conditions within which such
schemes may be undertaken. Where the labeling and certification schemes
adopt the standards incorporated in these negotiated agreements, in
principle there should be no problems in terms of compatibility with
international law. However, sometimes, it is the private sector standards
that become so influential that they are later incorporated into international
agreements. For example, the organic standards adopted by the IFOAM
were later used in the guidelines developed by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission and the European Union legislation on organic agriculture.75
While these schemes may in general be seen as compatible with inter-
national law because of their voluntary nature, the existing trade rules do
call for a balance between regulatory autonomy and social justice and for
ensuring that such schemes do not become a disguised barrier to trade.
Those schemes that only list product characteristics or product related
PPMs (Process and Production Methods) can be seen as consistent with
World Trade Organization rules. Voluntary schemes are likely to be more
compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. More compre-
hensive schemes and schemes where public authorities play a role may
conflict with WTO rules in the future.
The analysis reveals three types of controversies. The first is in
relation to the adequacy of the standards being developed. The competing
schemes use different standards developed through vastly different
processes and the way the information is communicated to the consumer
does not really allow for informed choices. Whether these standards really
achieve the sustainable development goals embodied in them is also
sometimes questionable. The second is the issue of market success. The
rise of these schemes clearly indicates that there is a perceived demand and
consumers are willing to buy these products. However, the research also
indicates that for the moment these schemes remain niche schemes and
have yet to become popular.
The third issue is the trade impacts on developing countries. Many of
these schemes purport to protect social and environmental goals in these
countries. For example, the development of such schemes may lead
purchasers to move from producer to producer to find someone that meets
their standards. However, many developing country producers are small-
74. Van Der Grijp & Brander, supra note 72, at 75.
75. Id. at 76.
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scale operators that cannot easily either know or meet these standards. Fair
trade schemes actually try to deal with this part of the problem by helping
these producers meet the standards required. Other schemes help to enforce
international law agreements and standards and thereby serve to reinforce
international law as well as protect the local people and their environment.
Some farmers in the developing countries are already extensively benefiting
from their participation in, for example, certified organic food and
vegetable production. In some Latin American countries garment producers
are benefiting through their participation in the Kuyuchi jeans scheme.
However, there is a very real threat in terms of barriers to trade. In the
global trading system, many developing countries are only allowed to sell a
certain quota of products to some Western countries. The adoption of
formal and informal certification and labeling schemes may further limit the
opportunities for export. An indirect trade barrier arises when small
producers without much access to capital or knowledge are unable to easily
adapt to the changing standards in Western countries and (especially when
there is a proliferation of such schemes) to the different standards adopted
in different countries. Another problem is that most of these schemes are
developed in the West with very little participation from developing
country producers and/or developing country stakeholders. As such, these
schemes rarely take into account the actual situation pertaining to the
production process, and may run the risk of applying standards that do not
serve to address the purported goal. All these may lead developing country
producers to face new market access problems. "[L]abeling and
certification schemes could thus give rise to trade barriers for the poorest
countries where professionalisation of production is least developed and
could lead to the further marginalization of the most vulnerable groups, the
workers in the informal sector. ''76  The only way one can address this
problem is by enhancing the legitimacy of these schemes by ensuring that
they are developed through processes that are characterized by good
governance. Through the application of such good governance principles, it
may be possible to achieve balance between autonomy to market actors and
social justice principles. At the same time, the case studies did not reveal
an existing serious problem of diminished market access as a result of these
schemes primarily because of their niche character.77
76. Id. at 82 (citing Kuik and Van der Woerd).
77. When one looks at whether such schemes are compatible with trade law, one needs in
particular to look at the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and subsequently the
World Trade Organization and the new Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and its Code of Good
Conduct. This is an issue that has many legal uncertainties. However, despite the uncertainties, one can
argue that the sustainability labeling schemes may become subject to the provisions of the Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement.
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V. CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
This paper has argued that globalization has changed the processes by
which governance is being exercised to address key global environmental
and developmental problems. Globalization has not only revolutionized
communication technology, both for the media and the civil society in such
a way that knowledge and information (including disinformation) can travel
all over the globe within a matter of seconds to all kinds of recipients,
including, unintended recipients. This has empowered civil society to
become both, a key actor in global governance and to push for measures
worldwide to address perceived problems. Governance is no longer limited
to those formally in power with a ticket to fly to a UN Conference.
Governance has become open to those stakeholders who decide that they
will harness the communication technology to influence global policy. The
role of global civil society in stopping progression on the Multilateral
Agreement on Investments is a case in point.
As a result there is a shift in the locus of power from state-centered
decision making (except perhaps in cases of high politics) to supranational
and lower governmental bodies, to courts, to the press and to civil society.
Not only that, within the traditional sphere of liberal inter-governmentalism
and intergovernmental negotiations, there are rapid developments taking
place like the development of interactional law, which will catch many
senior and conservative lawyers with surprise, while the rise of initiatives to
involve the private sector in environmental treaties might lead to an uneasy
marriage between public and private international law.
In the process, new governance interactions are visible. The case
studies of water, climate change and the WSSD show the permutations and
combinations of the interactions that are taking place. Against this
background, the issue of sustainability labeling and certification schemes
initiated by non-state actors has been discussed. This goes far beyond the
traditional types of schemes and is -a parallel form of governance that
attempts to challenge traditional inter-governmentalism, justifying this
attack on the grounds of purity of motive of protecting humans and the
environment. The question is: Is this to be a short-lived trend that cannot
hold up in a court of law if it turns out to conflict with existing trade law?
Or, is this a sign of things to come?
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